By framing the debate over human nature as "nature vs. nurture," Galton relegated traditional religious conceptions of human nature and psychology to the "superstitious past." He was intensely anti-religious, claiming in Hereditary Genius that religious leaders usually have "wretched constitutions" and are not eminent and talented individuals. Indeed, Galton believed that a "pious disposition is decidedly hereditary," and I suspect this was one of the traits he hoped would disappear as a result of his eugenics program, along with idiocy and other defects. The principles of eugenics, he declared, must "be introduced into the national conscience, like a new religion."1 Among Galton's staunch opponents were those insisting on the existence of a human soul and especially those believing in human free will.
Gillham's biography attempts to rehabilitate Galton's image, tarnished like all eugenicists' in the wake of the Holocaust. Gillham does this first by stressing Galton's many scientific accomplishments, especially in his studies on human heredity. Not only does Gillham point out the indisputable advances Galton made in the use of statistics, but he also exults in his use of pedigree analysis and twin studies, techniques still used by geneticists. More debatable is his portrayal of Galton as a precursor to the famous German biologist August Weismann, though, to be fair, Galton did indeed reject the inheritance of acquired characteristics (Lamarckism), just as Weismann did.
Gillham really overplays his hand, however, by depicting Galton as a forerunner of Mendelian genetics. In his most important and influential book, Natural Inheritance (1889), Galton embraced the ideas of particulate inheritance and latent heredity that Mendel would incorporate into his famous theory. However, Galton's Ancestral Law of Heredity, formulated in 1897, was a huge misstep that would be swept away in the Mendelian Revolution. Furthermore, Gillham admits that Galton's 1889 book also spawned biometrics, a branch of biology devoted to statistical studies of heredity. Biometricians, including Galton's two main disciples, the mathematician Karl Pearson and the biologist Raphael Weldon, were the chief opponents of Mendelian genetics after the rediscovery of Mendel in 1900. Gillham unfortunately avoids discussing Galton's own position in the debate over Mendelian genetics, though he provides considerable detail about Pearson's and Weldon's acrimonious disputes with the early Mendelians. No, Galton did not really anticipate Mendel. Rather, Mendel's laws of heredity overthrew Galton's law.
The second way Gillham attempts to restore Galton's respectability is by distancing Galton from the eugenics movement he spawned. In both the prologue and epilogue, Gillham tries to banish the specter of involuntary sterilization, racism, and Nazi eugenics by presenting them as illegitimate offspring of Galton's eugenics. To be sure, Galton emphasized positive eugenics (i.e., encouraging those with "better heredity" to reproduce more abundantly) more than negative eugenics (i.e., restricting those with "worse heredity" from reproducing). Most critics of twentieth-century eugenics measures target negative eugenics, especially compulsory sterilization, which was practiced not only in Nazi Germany, but also in the United States, Scandinavia, and elsewhere.






