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Despite many noteworthy insights, Stackhouse appears to press intellectual humility too far in the direction of uncertainty. He thinks that staking a strong claim for the truth and rationality of Christian theism is incompatible with humility. A humble approach will not attempt to prove Christianity "beyond a reasonable doubt." In fact, he claims this cannot be done.
This is questionable for two reasons. First, one may have certainty about the rational adequacy of Christianity (and even its rational superiority over other worldviews) and not fall into pride. Humility is a moral virtue that recognizes God as the source of all goodness, both intellectual and moral. It knows its limits, but doesn't flinch from holding to the truth. One may marshal powerful arguments for the truth of Christianity in a patient, kind, and respectful fashion. William Lane Craig does this regularly in his debates with high-powered unbelievers.
Second, many respected apologists claim that the case for the truth and rationality of Christian theism is stronger than Stackhouse suggests. Many apologists would be reluctant to agree with Stackhouse that Buddhism and naturalism can be rationally believed, and that apologists can argue only for Christianity's intellectual parity with other worldviews. If other significant worldviews are as rational as Christianity, then adherents of these worldviews would not be accountable to God for their unbelief, which cuts against the argument of the first two chapters of Romans. Aside from a few general comments, Stackhouse does not offer any argument why the best apologetic arguments are unable to secure conviction beyond reasonable doubt. He does not refer to the work of Richard Swinburne, who has offered a deep and sustained case for Christian theism over the past 25 years.
The Resurrection of God Incarnate is a very different book. Swinburne's work is the epitome of analytic philosophy and meant primarily for scholars (although its most technical material is saved for an appendix). He has previously written a trilogy defending the existence of God and a tetralogy on the philosophy of Christian doctrine. This thin but dense new book builds on the conclusions of his previous work and tackles the central claim of Christianity: God incarnate atoned for our sins and was raised from the dead.
Swinburne has higher hopes for apologetic success than does Stackhouse. His pattern of argument is incremental, nuanced, and attentive to possible objections at every turn. He does not offer deductive proofs, since these are not available for the subject matter he addresses—and in this sense, Swinburne's approach is properly humble without conceding too much to uncertainty. Along the way, he introduces many fruitful concepts not usually considered by apologists.
Swinburne, unlike the Reformed epistemologists, believes that versions of the classical apologetics project can rationally ground Christian faith. One first argues for monotheism, then for Christian particulars. Instead of making belief in God or the entire Christian worldview "properly basic" (warranted without need of external evidence), Swinburne has in other books employed inductive versions of the cosmological, design, and religious experience arguments for God's existence. In this book, he argues that if there is "evidence giving substantial probability to the existence of God," then we have antecedent evidence for an Incarnation. He chides biblical scholars for approaching New Testament texts without taking this background evidence into account.
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