Since Ault started attending Shawmut River as a self-described atheist academic, this mutual trust was nothing less than a bridge across the chasm of the culture wars that continue to roil America. When he began his fieldwork, the religious dimensions of the post-'60s liberal-conservative divide had only begun to attract notice. Now, as we perch on the brink of the most highly polarized presidential election in over a century, both liberals and conservatives pay obsessive attention to the "religion gap." Churchgoers' voting patterns, Democrats' discomfort with religion, and Republicans' manipulation of it are part of everyday election analysis.
Ault's two worlds of friends—at home, at church—occasionally obliged him to enflesh stereotypes of the opposing camps. On one side, Ault's colleagues were urbane, educated scholars who not only didn't believe in demons but regarded those who did as pathetically ignorant, if not pathologically rigid, right-wing screwballs. On the other side, Ault's friends at church railed against "secular humanists" whose faithlessness and "selfishness" were destroying the family and taking the country to hell with them.
But Ault's very presence in the church belied the liberal cant that fundamentalists aren't flexible. Pastor Valenti's wife Sharon was one of many who were disturbed that Ault wasn't saved. But she made room for him, even interpreted his presence at Shawmut River as part of God's plan. Was this orthodox fundamentalism? She didn't care. "I never know where you stand on things," she told Ault one day. "But somehow I think you understand."
Ault does understand, and he is at his best when pointing out the ironies of positions on both sides of the liberal-conservative divide. For example, at Shawmut River, women defended the Pauline biblical injunction that wives be submissive to their husbands, but effectively controlled interpretation and practice of this teaching to bolster their massive behind-the-scenes influence in church and family life. For their part, Ault's feminist colleagues eagerly championed many women—black or poor women, for example—who figured out crafty and daring ways to wield power without directly challenging patriarchal frames; why was it so hard for these feminists to admit that white fundamentalist women might be doing the same thing?
Ault's weakest point, on the other hand, is his explanation of why political conservatism and religious fundamentalism go hand in hand. Because, he says, fundamentalism mirrors assumptions about family already embedded in conservative politics. In contrast to liberals, raised in families that empowered you to go out and make it on your own, Shawmut River members were largely raised in extended families ordered by duty, sacrifice, and shared burdens. Fundamentalism offered a language and a book with the same values that shaped their formative years.
Ault thus avoids the false notion, widespread in liberal circles, that fundamentalism "causes" conservative politics, but he nevertheless fails to explain the particular appeal of fundamentalism. After all, there are many duty-oriented, extended-family communities, from African American churches to upper-class aristocracies, that are not fundamentalist, or even conservative. (This explanatory muddiness might account for the occasionally excessive repetition in the analytical parts of the book, which too often take the edge off its narrative momentum.)






