2 of 3
Previous deterrence pessimists did not draw extensively on empirical evidence, a problem Goldstein seeks to remedy by evaluating five cases in depth plus seven mini-cases. Some of the cases involve radical asymmetry while others involve cases in which neither side had a huge advantage in WMD capabilities, which enables assessment of whether the magnitude of the asymmetry makes a difference. For evidence, Goldstein relies on recent histories written by Chinese, Russian, and American historians; interviews in China, Russia, the United States, and Israel; and declassified U.S. documents. He acknowledges that the evidence is not always conclusive because most countries have not given scholars access to key records pertaining to WMD, but to make use of it judiciously is better than relying on no historical evidence at all.
In four of the five main cases and three of the seven mini-cases, radical asymmetry results in instability. In the other cases, the asymmetry is not radical in degree and no major crises erupt. In order to establish whether this correlation is the result of causation, Goldstein analyzes how radical WMD asymmetry influenced the thoughts, plans, and actions of the superior powers. For most of the cases and mini-cases, he demonstrates persuasively that radical asymmetry made war a more attractive option for the power with WMD superiority. He shows, for example, that during the early Cold War, when U.S. nuclear strength far exceeded that of the Soviets, some Americans recommended a war to destroy the Soviet Union and its nuclear program before the Soviets could build large numbers of nuclear weapons. The United States ultimately eschewed preventive war in the early Cold War not because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear capabilities but because it feared Soviet conventional capabilities and did not want to violate international norms. During the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, Goldstein argues in another case, the Soviets seriously considered military strikes on China's nascent nuclear installations, and they backed off only because they feared a prolonged ground war with China.
Two of the cases do not support Goldstein's central thesis as strongly. In one of his main cases, the U.S. and China in the 1960s, he attributes tensions between these two powers to China's efforts to develop its first nuclear weapons, but in actuality the tensions were almost entirely the result of China's support of Communist expansionism in Asia. Senior U.S. officials seldom mentioned the Chinese nuclear program as a major reason for going to war with China during this period. It is also a stretch to argue, as Goldstein does in his mini-case on the 1991 Gulf War, that WMD engendered instability that led to the first American war against Iraq, though the historical record is much more sketchy than on the U.S. and China in the 1960s owing to the closer proximity to the present. The evidence currently available indicates that America's principal motives for going to war were to stop aggression and protect oil supplies, not to eliminate WMD.
share this page
RSS Feed
