Viteritti agrees with Marci Hamilton in opposing use of religious freedom gambits to shield sexual molestation or medical neglect of children. But Hamilton also rejects freedom claims in less dire situations. She especially laments the 1963 Sherbert decision, in a Sabbath observance case, which fixed the principle that government needs a "compelling state interest" to override religious freedom. The subsequent Yoder ruling (1972) applied that doctrine to grant the Amish the right to avoid compulsory high school attendance. Hamilton praises—and Viteritti opposes—Justice Scalia's 1990 Smith decision, which scuttled the "compelling state interest" rule and said religious individuals and groups must obey laws that generally apply to others. With the "free exercise" guarantee thus weakened, successful religious lawsuits since have largely cited other constitutional rights (free speech, freedom of association, equal protection, due process).
Viteritti, a political scientist who has been appointed by leading New York Democrats to various advisory panels, plunged into the church-state vortex in 1999 with the influential Choosing Equality: School Choice, the Constitution, and Civil Society (Brookings Institution). Like Last Freedom, the earlier work argued for the constitutionality of tax-supported vouchers so disadvantaged children in inadequate urban schools can afford tuition at religious or other private schools. This is not aid to religion as such, he argues, but provides needy parents educational choices as a matter of equal justice. Regarding choice of social services, Viteritti cites research indicating that clients vastly prefer "faith-based" providers and says they should also receive public aid.
The Viteritti doctrine would "grant people of faith the most generous scope of freedom possible without infringing on public order" or limiting peoples' right to believe or to disbelieve. He wants to maximize freedom of conscience and "minimize situations in which the state uses its authority to force people to do something they think is wrong."
The underlying problem, Viteritti contends, has been a "negative predisposition toward religion in the courts." A "snobbish bigotry," rooted in fear and ignorance, infects not only judges but other cultural elites. He believes that a wide swath of intellectuals, opinion leaders, and influential media mistakenly suppose that Americans who take religion seriously "are irrational and uninformed, a stupid lot who must be treated with suspicion."
Unlike the anti-theocracy crowd, Viteritti therefore concludes that the risks from "antireligious sentiment now outweigh the risks that emerge from the outbreaks of religious zealotry that have dotted the political landscape; to put it more bluntly, the threats from the left are more dangerous than those from the right." He finds that most Americans fall into an ambiguous "hollow middle," rejecting both rigid secularism and overly intrusive religion. Yet Americans generally favor religion's role in society, unlike the Supreme Court and government, which Viteritti says engineered secularization of public life and the public schools during recent decades.






