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The most impressive thing about the economic activity of Maquis Park is the social order that is both produced by and necessary for such a functioning underground economy. Informal enforcement of codes of conduct and contract fulfillment occur through repeat dealings that strongly reinforce the importance of reputation. Local pastors serve an important arbitration function among residents, and the local drug lord uses his power to prevent anarchy. The overall picture is one of a thriving, functioning economy where informal rules and extralegal enforcement mechanisms have created enough order for a reasonable level of production and exchange to occur.
This small-scale society, like much larger societies, struggles with the perpetual problem of creating a structure that can employ coercion when necessary to maintain social order while yet limiting that coercive power to its appropriate function. Marlene Matteson, a widowed mother of three, is one of the local community leaders who enlists the services of a local pastor to arrange a weekly group meeting with Johnny "Big Cat" Williams, the leader of the neighborhood gang. Marlene wants Big Cat to keep his drug dealers out of the local park in the afternoon when the children are coming home from school, and also wants to limit the areas in which pimps and prostitutes work. For several years Big Cat, who depends upon a certain degree of community trust for his activities, is willing to use his coercive power to enforce the extralegal arrangements that Marlene, her friends, and Pastor Wilkins want to see in place. Unfortunately, over time Big Cat decides that he needs more power and more revenue and starts to extract larger payments from legitimate businesses. He also becomes less willing to enforce the agreed-upon rules with regard to the local park and the streets, where much of the community activity takes place. The other informal third-party arbiters find that Big Cat's desire to extract more from the community gradually destroys their ability to enforce contracts and secure order.
In this respect Maquis Park turns out to resemble the underdeveloped parts of the world. These societies, like Maquis Park, enjoy a thriving internal trade and rely upon a set of informal rules that govern exchange. Unfortunately, despite the proximity of much richer societies, localized exchange networks in the undeveloped world typically lack a governance structure that enables access to the world of impersonal exchange, a world that allows for the specialization and gains from trade that move people out of poverty.
Maquis Park seems to get the worst of its relationship with formal government at two levels. The police enforce certain rules within the community, dealing with crimes of major theft and murder, but don't seem to be trusted enough to play much more than a minimal role. It is clear that formal government is failing to perform its basic functions of protection of life and property and enforcement of contracts. At the same time, the heavy hand of the regulatory state extends deep into the community. Minimum wage laws, requirements for contributions to pension funds, workplace safety and workman's compensation legislation, and the like have the effect of making legal jobs cumbersome and costly. Hence, every legitimate business finds a major part of its labor supply in the illegal sector; it's much easier to hire people under the table than to fulfill numerous requirements for hiring a legal worker. In short, Maquis Park gets the costs of modern government with few of the benefits.
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