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Philosophers may not be satisfied by Wiker's use of the term materialism, since he includes in his definition far more than strict philosophical materialism, i.e., the view that nothing exists except matter and energy. He states that "Epicurean materialism allows the gods to exist, as long as they are unable to interfere in human affairs." Thus, Epicurean materialism includes pure materialism, but also encompasses positivism, deism, and some forms of pantheism.
Wiker opens the book with an illuminating discussion of Epicurus's philosophy in ancient Greece. Epicurus constructed his philosophy to eliminate the widespread human fears of divine intervention and punishment in the afterlife, which, he believed, caused unnecessary disturbance in people's psyches. Though he did not deny the existence of deities, he claimed that they did not interfere with human affairs in any way. Without any influence from gods or an afterlife, morality could only have reference to this life.
Epicurus reduced morality to the pleasure-pain principle, which states that whatever maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain is morally good. Epicurus and many of his ancient Greek followers emphasized moderation (bordering on asceticism) rather than indulgence, because they believed that the avoidance of pain was more important than the pursuit of pleasure. Modern Epicureans would invert this formula, jettisoning asceticism in pursuit of carnal pleasure.
The triumph of Christianity in the late Roman and early medieval period effectively subdued Epicureanism until the Renaissance, when Greek philosophy and culture revived somewhat. Especially influential in spreading Epicureanism among Renaissance humanists was the rediscovery of Lucretius's poem, De rerum Natura.
According to Wiker, Lucretius anticipated—indeed heavily influenced—a good deal of modern, secular thought, ranging from social contract ideas in political theory to scientific ideas, such as Darwinian natural selection. Quoting extensively from Lucretius to prove his point, Wiker states, "Lucretius seems so modern because we are so Lucretian." Indeed Wiker does effectively illustrate close parallels between Lucertius's Epicureanism and naturalistic philosophies (and science) in the modern period.
These parallels raise some important historical questions. Did Epicureanism directly influence the rise of naturalistic philosophy in modern times, as Wiker forcefully contends? If so, how and when?
Though he succeeds in showing that some Renaissance thinkers were sympathetic with the rediscovered Epicurean philosophy, Wiker's attempt to link Epicureanism with medieval nominalism, Protestantism, and the Scientific Revolution are problematic.
Indeed, Wiker identifies the key turning point in the rise of naturalistic philosophy earlier than most intellectual historians. He argues that "a complete moral revolution and the secularization of Western society followed directly upon the seventeenth century scientific revolution." He blames Galileo, Newton, and Locke for smuggling Epicurean materialism into the Christian world. They allegedly did this by promoting a world view that was essentially Epicurean, though retaining enough of a Christian gloss to deflect criticism.
Why is Wiker so critical of the Scientific Revolution? First, he apparently holds Aristotle in high esteem and opposes the anti-Aristotelian thrust of the leading figures in the Scientific Revolution. Second, Galileo and other scientists erred, according to Wiker, by identifying nature with mathematics, which operates totally independently of divine intervention. Thirdly, he blames Newton and others for allegedly integrating Epicurean materialism into their natural philosophy by accepting atomism and the universality of natural law.
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