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To the contrary, the Oslo accords birthed a strange alliance between the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian leadership. The process seemed to groom the Palestinian leadership for a secondary role of controlling its own population on behalf of the occupation, not for statehood and sovereignty. It appeared that Israel intended to dole out symbols of sovereignty to the Palestinian leaders only as rewards for serving Israel's security.

The complex mechanics of the process involved dividing the occupied territories into three categories of jurisdiction. Area A consisted of the heavily populated centers of the Palestinian towns, which Oslo I required the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to administer. But the Israeli forces still controlled travel, economy, water sources, and legislation in these areas.

Area B consisted of the villages in the West Bank and Gaza, with the PNA having civil control and the Israelis retaining security control.

Area C contained the Israeli settlements, military installations, and "everything else"—about 70 percent of the West Bank at the time—which remained under full direct Israeli control. The peace accord called for more of the West Bank to be turned from Area C to B, and then to A, over time, in order for these areas eventually to come within the control of the PNA.

Status quo: Israeli occupation
The process also entailed making agreements about how these territories were to be turned over to gradual Palestinian control. But since Israel controlled the land, it also dominated the negotiations. In the absence of any rules, laws, or a reference point, internal Israeli politics became the most important element in determining the pace of turning over the territories (from Area C to B and from Area B to A). Average Israelis felt they were making concessions every time they turned over properties, and such steps increasingly became unpopular and politically costly for Israeli leaders.

On the other hand, average Palestinians were frustrated by the slowness of the process, and felt little improvement in their daily lot, even in the areas that were turned over to the PNA. Israeli concerns, including security and settlements, remained under exclusive Israeli authority. Not so with issues of interest to Palestinians: Matters of Palestinian refugees, Palestinian statehood, an end to Israeli settlements, and Jerusalem were hostage to a large number of joint committees in which Israel had veto power. Progress or action on even minor peripheral matters required Israeli cooperation, which often was seemingly withheld at whim.

Just to maintain normal operations, the PNA had to bow to Israeli wishes and demands repeatedly. Israel collected the revenues and customs, controlled imports and exports, controlled movement from and within the territories, and monopolized the economy. Gradually, the PNA ended up playing the role of a stooge for the occupation. Its own inefficiency and corruption (conveniently ignored by Israel and the United States) did not help its credibility.

In addition, the process had no mechanism for enforcing the Oslo agreements, or for meaningfully resolving disputes and disagreements. The parties were supposed to agree, and if they failed, they could (but only if they both agreed to do so) ask the U.S. for help in resolving disputes. The plan failed to discuss arbitration, the role of international or u.n. law, or outside third-party intervention. This meant that the more powerful party, the one with control on the ground, ran the process. The weaker party, while bound by unbalanced agreements, had no recourse if the stronger party failed to carry them out or desired to change agreements.

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January 8 2001, Vol. 45, No. 1