2 of 3

Your book says that 7 percent, or 91 million, of 1.3 billion Muslims worldwide think the 9/11 attacks were "completely" justified, leaving 93 percent as moderates. Ninety-one million is a big number, but other studies put Islamic extremism at an even higher level.

We must define extremism. If it's the number of people actually involved in violence, the number is much less than 7 percent. Analysts estimate thousands, not millions. If it's about people who sympathize with extremists, we must define what it means to sympathize. But our goal was not to quantify percentages of so-called extremists, but to understand the fringe element and how they differ from mainstream Muslims.

Do you question a Sunday Telegraph report in 2006, for example, that claimed the percentage of UK Muslims who were "radical" jumped from 15 percent in 2001 to 43 percent in 2006?

If we use the same measuring stick on the American public, we find that a whopping 31 percent are extremists. The University of Maryland surveyed [Americans on] the justifiability of attacks on civilians, and nearly one-third said "sometimes." That kind of definition might be good for newspaper headlines, but it does not give the information needed to understand the fringe element.

What do most Muslims think about apostates?

Apostates are not very popular in any religion, so [Muslims] definitely view leaving Islam as a terrible idea. On the other hand, in any faith community, it's not something people think should be handled violently. Our study shows it is dangerous to call other Muslims apostates. An important declaration several years ago by a group of prominent scholars, the Amman Message, defined what it means to call someone else an apostate and how theologically incorrect it is to use such terms against fellow Muslims.

Don't all four schools of Sunni Islamic law suggest that a Muslim who leaves Islam and embraces Christianity, for example, should be executed?

We have to look at modern interpretations, because Islamic law is a vibrant, ever-changing set of interpretations. Fiqh, or human interpretation of Shari'ah, maps changes with time and place. Look, for example, at Sheikh Ali Jumu'a, grand mufti of Egypt, whose interpretation of apostasy laws is not to take drastic measures. In the past, apostasy was seen as treason because citizenship in one group was defined by faith, and when people left one faith, they had to work against their community. One's faith today is no longer seen in the same context, because the nation-state has been completely transformed.

How do you respond to conventional wisdom that says the Qur'an espouses violence?

First, [violent] verses have a historical context and must be understood and interpreted in a specific way. Second, if the Qur'an espouses violence, then we should have a greater percentage of Muslims involved in violence. Violence is usually politically, not religiously, motivated. Third, terrorist sympathizers or the "cheering section"—the 7 percent who are politically radicalized—are no more religious than mainstream Muslims who abhor violence and say it is morally unjustified. Muslims are as likely as Americans to denounce attacks on civilians. Finally, people defending their position on 9/11—the 7 percent who think it's completely justified—do so because of political and geopolitical perceptions, not theology. Not one referred to the Qur'an. Their responses could have come from an atheist. They see the U.S. as an imperialist power trying to control the world. Those who condemned 9/11 quoted Qur'anic verses that forbid killing innocent people. So moral objection to terrorism is competing with political rage, and people can go either way.

next page... |  2 of 3

share this page

November 2008, Vol. 52, No. 11