A most crucial question of contemporary theology probes the ground for orthodox trinitarian doctrine. According to historic Christianity, trinitarianism characterizes not only God’s manifestations of himself to man, but God as he is in himself.
For much anti-metaphysical modern thought, however, nothing can be known in itself, let alone the infinite God! Men can know God’s mighty acts, but not God per se. Propositional revelation of God’s very nature is banished from its venerable theological throne; revelation in act or event has usurped exclusive rights to the kingdom of contemporary theology.
Assuming that revelation is in act not assertion, can theologians avoid the ancient heresy of modalism? Modalists (Sabellians) in the early Church alleged the three Persons were merely ways in which God revealed himself to men, not distinctions within God’s own essence. It is questionable if those whose principle of authority is non-propositional can claim more. Henry P. VanDusen observes, “The crucial question in all speculative thought about the Trinity is precisely this: whether it is legitimate, indeed necessary, to recognize as true of the inmost reality of the Divine Being distinctions which are indisputably real within our experience of the Divine Being” (Theology Today [October, 1958], p. 378).
Two heroic attempts have been made to establish an ontological trinitarianism from a basis of revelation as act. Upon that ground Leonard Hodgson, the distinguished Anglican theologian, reasons inductively or synthetically to the doctrine of the Trinity, and upon that ground Karl Barth reasons analytically to trinitarianism. Can either synthetic or analytic reasoning from temporal events (albeit revelatory) lead us to truth about the very nature of the eternal God?
Leonard Hodgson’s Induction
“I have rejected as unprofitable,” Leonard Hodgson writes in The Doctrine of the Trinity (Nisbet, 1943), a view of the Bible “as giving revelation in the form of propositions concerning the inner mysteries of the Godhead” (p. 229). The starting point of Hodgson’s trinitarianism is the given data of Christ’s “birth, ministry, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension” (p. 25) as well as Pentecost and the presently observable “new life of communion with God into which Christians have been taken” (p. 138). Hodgson then seeks a “postulate,” or “adequate account,” for the facts of Christ, Pentecost, and Christian experience. The doctrine of the Trinity turns out to be the best “philosophical-theological attempt to grasp what must be the nature of the God who makes Himself known in this way” (p. 139).
While many agree that God cannot be totally other than he condescends to reveal himself to man to be, Dr. Hodgson has given no reasons in support of this conclusion. From a purely experiential point of view a modalistic hypothesis accounts for all the data as consistently as Hodgson’s postulate. Sabellius, for example, maintained that God in relation to creation is Father; God in relation to Jesus Christ is Son; and God in relation to the Church is Holy Spirit. According to Sabellius the three persons are not modes of the eternal Being, but merely modes of divine revelation in time. Does not the merely functional trinity of Sabellius account for the data to which Hodgson appeals? On what ground, then, does Hodgson prefer the ontological to the modalistic hypothesis? His experiential evidence does not require it, and he has ruled out propositional revelation concerning the nature of God. Since no other basis is provided, his conclusion concerning “what must be the nature of the God who makes Himself known in this way” seems to be without foundation.
We here question the necessity of Hodgson’s argument, not its possibility. If in fact we did not have scriptural assertion concerning the God who acts in human history, Hodgson’s case would be usefully employed, although tentative indeed. Granting the decisiveness of the apostolic interpretations of Christ and Christian experience, which Hodgson seems to do, then why question the trustworthiness of their written assertions? So far as he hesitates to grant authority to propositional revelation of the nature of the God who acts in Christ and Christian experience, he weakens his case for trinitarianism, and fails to provide adequate ground for escaping modalism.
While Karl Barth in his Church Dogmatics also rejects propositional revelation, he seeks to avoid the problems of inductive reasoning by alleging that “analysis” of revelatory acts yields trinitarian dogma (Church Dogmatics I, pp. 351, 358). The doctrine, according to a follower of Barth, Claude Welch (In This Name, Scribner’s, 1952), “is not an inductive conclusion from scientia, but an arche, a pre-supposition of thought which is given to men in the new logos in Christ” (p. 245). Consideration of revelatory acts involves the immediate implication of the unity and threefoldness of the revealing God. For example, when Peter confesses “Jesus Christ is Lord,” the Lord God is revealed in Christ by the Holy Spirit. In revelation Barth discovers the “Revealer, Revelation, and Revealedness” (I, 1, p. 361), or “veiling, unveiling, and impartation” (I, 1, p. 431). This threefoldness, Welch insists, is not merely modalistic, but “is in the structure or pattern of the one of God in Christ and therefore the structure of all divine activity and of the Being of God” (op. cit., p. 223). Whereas Hodgson rejects all statements about relations among the persons of the Trinity as unfounded, Welch condemns such an injustice to the Fathers who accepted the Bible as revelation and were not “altogether misled in this matter of the doctrine of relations” (p. 205).
Karl Barth’s Analysis
Does Barth’s analysis achieve the astounding feat of beginning with an event in history and necessarily concluding with a triune doctrine of God in Himself? Maurice Wiles’s expression of “Some Reflections on the Origins of the Doctrine of the Trinity” in The Journal of Theological Studies, sharpens the issue:
We are not starting with the assumption of a revealed trinitarian doctrine of God and then looking at the manner of God’s self-revealing activity in the world to see if it can appropriately be understood in a way which corresponds to the already known trinitarian nature of God. We are, on the contrary, seeking to look at the activity of God to see if it is of such unquestionably threefold character that we are forced, in order to explain it rationally, to postulate a threefold character in God himself (VIII [April 1957], p. 93).
Wiles, who rejects the Bible as propositional revelation because “it appears to conflict with the whole idea of the nature of revelation to which Biblical criticism has led us” (p. 104), also rejects the formulations of Barth and Welch. In his judgment:
For all the advocacy of Karl Barth, it seems impossible seriously to maintain that the statement about revelation is something that requires a trinitarian explanation. The whole argument sounds suspiciously like a later rationalization to support a doctrine really based on … [propositional revelation] and now in search of a new foundation” (p. 105).
Why, for example, does not Welch supply some reasons for the following assumption: “We must reaffirm the judgment that God in himself cannot be other than God in his revelation” (op. cit., p. 219)? This is precisely the point to be substantiated in answering modalism. Sabellius regarded not only human words but also temporal acts insufficient media for revealing the nature of God. For the ancient modalist the acts of Christ and experiences of the Holy Spirit were accommodations of the Eternal to time; the hidden God remained unknown. Barth, on the other hand, is certain that the acts of God in human experience must reveal God per se, but agrees with Sabellius that the scriptural words cannot convey truth concerning the divine essence. On what basis can Barth maintain that human propositions alter divine truth while incarnate acts do not? Are we to believe that God cannot reveal propositions true of his own nature, but Barth can analyze events in a way that must be true of the divine nature? Without propositional revelation what reason have we for following Barth rather than Sabellius? It is not enough for Welch to “reaffirm” the ungrounded assertion that “God in Himself cannot be other than God in His revelation.” The assertion may be true enough; it is its basis that we here challenge.
Furthermore, why does Barth stop with a threefold analysis of the event of revelation? Wiles is willing to follow the analytic approach where it leads, and it leads to a startling conclusion. “Our Trinity of revelation is an arbitrary analysis of the activity of God, which though of value in Christian thought and devotion is not of essential significance” (op. cit., p. 104). Wiles admits that this view is revolutionary, but “no more so than the break-away from the idea of propositional revelation of which it appears to be the logical conclusion” (p. 106). As the thought continues, the completed orthodox doctrine of the Trinity can logically be known only on the basis of propositional revelation about the inner mysteries of the Godhead. Remove that foundation and the necessity (not the desirability or value) of trinitarian thought is removed. With D. M. Edwards, Wiles is led on to this conclusion: “The modern mind … cannot see any necessity of thought for fixing on the number three, neither less nor more.… No convincing reason can be given why, in view of the rich manifoldness of divine functions and activities, the number of hypostases may not be increased indefinitely” (p. 106).
The observed weaknesses in the kingdom of non-propositional revelation lead to a reconsideration of richer view of authority including both act and proposition.
Lowry’s Fallible Propositions
Dr. Charles W. Lowry, former professor at Virginia Theological Seminary, in The Trinity and Christian Devotion (Harper, 1946) judges that the most serious difficulty facing theories of revelation exclusively as act, is the biblical data itself. Examining such assertions as: “God is love,” “God is Spirit,” “I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter,” “Upon this rock I will build my church,” and “The Word became flesh and dwelt among us,” Lowry says, “It is not easy to see how the formula of revelation given simply in act or event covers the ground. I believe accordingly, that there is no alternative to positing, in the full light of modern criticism, a special inspiration of Holy Scripture” (pp. 64 f.). Lowry goes so far as to say, “The Bible remains, when all is said and done, the greatest miracle of all time. It is in actuality the Word of God, since it is only through its witness, record and interpretation that we confront and are confronted by the deeds and speech of the living God” (p. 78).
Nevertheless, Dr. Lowry adds, “The Bible is human and fallible as well as Divine and authoritative” (p. 66). But if that be the case, trinitarianism is not supported with any degree of necessity. The very propositions which imply the doctrine may be in error. A Bible with propositional revelations which may be untrue is incapable of conclusively sustaining ontological trinitarianism.
Lowry admits the undue tension of his position that the Bible is both fallible and divinely authoritative:
The working out of the dialectical problem set us by this dual character of the Holy Scriptures is not easy. It is not easy for the common man. It is probably still harder for theologians and scholars. But it is a task that has to be accepted and worked at with energy (ibid.).
Until Dr. Lowry can resolve the problem of biblical criticism in some measure, and recognize propositions certified by verbal inspiration, he will not have secure ground upon which to defend his belief that the Trinity is necessary to Christian faith and devotion.
Orthodoxy’s Infallible Propositions
In view of the inconclusiveness of the inductive, analytic, and fallible propositional bases for trinitarianism, either the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity must be regarded as unnecessary to Christianity or the doctrine must be founded upon propositional revelation and verbal inspiration. On any basis short of this it seems impossible to make assured assertions concerning the inner nature of God. Upon the ground of certified cognitive truths Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Luther, who did not ignore the incarnate acts of God, have structured their doctrine of the Trinity. They may not have used the explicit terms propositional and verbal, but they employed the concepts those words express. For example, Augustine’s first goal in his classic De Trinitate is to “demonstrate, according to the authority of the Holy Scriptures, whether the [trinitarian] faith be so” (I, 2, 4). On that authority, orthodox theologians maintained, God in himself is triune. They did not claim fully to comprehend the Trinity, but the incomprehensibility of God did not imply irrationality. Admittedly their limited knowledge of God’s nature was indirect (1 Cor. 13:12) in being mediated through linguistic and visible signs, but it was not therefore untrue.
Can we, today, in view of biblical criticism continue the allegedly uncritical position of orthodoxy’s stalwarts? Men enlightened in modern critical procedures and results do defend a trustworthy propositional revelation in conjunction with revelation in mighty acts, or as one of the greatest of these acts. Since we cannot here present anything like a full statement of the case, we mention Bernard Ramm, Special Revelation and the Word of God (Eerdmans, 1961); Paul Jewett, Emil Brunner’s Concept of Revelation (James Clark, 1954); and Carl F. H. Henry (ed.), Revelation and the Bible (Baker, 1958).
Furthermore, in the full light of modern criticism Frederick C. Grant concludes that the historic view of Scripture is the biblical view of itself. In the New Testament, Grant observes, “it is every where taken for granted that Scripture is trustworthy, infallible and inerrant.… No New Testament writer would ever dream of questioning a statement contained in the Old Testament” (Introduction to New Testament Thought, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1950, p. 75). Biblically, God reveals himself not only in events, but in words and assertions (1 Sam. 3:21; Dan. 2:28; Matt. 16:17; 11:25; Rom. 16:25; Gal. 1:12). Our Lord himself accepted the Old Testament as true in its assertions of fact and reality (Matt. 5:17, 18; John 5:46, 47; 10:35). The Apostles shared the view of their Master (2 Tim. 3:15, 16; 2 Pet. 1:19–21; 3:16; 2 John 9). As Professor Ned Stonehouse said, “Apart from clarity and unity in understanding the Lordship of Christ as coming to expression in the Holy Scriptures, there can be no theological wholeness and no lasting assurance of advancement in theological education” (CHRISTIANITY TODAY [Feb. 16, 1959], p. 36). The truth of that dictum is vividly illustrated in relation to the basis of trinitarian doctrine. Apart from its culmination in propositional communiques the whole revelation process remains ambiguous concerning the triune nature of God.
It is not only biblical criticism which shatters confidence in inspired assertions; phenomenalistic philosophy also challenges scriptural authority. It is evident to twentieth-century eyes that the biblical authors expressed their own interpretations of events from their personal perspectives. Can we then claim any measure of objectivity even for biblically based knowledge? Are we not limited to a complete relativism and phenomenalism? In his Language and Religion (Philosophical Library, 1957) Ben F. Kimpel shows that “a distinction must be made between knowledge which consists of interpretations and knowledge which is exclusively of interpretations” (p. 39). The latter is phenomenalism. On that position no metaphysical truth of the Trinity could be attained, even with the assistance of Scripture. However, on the former alternative, realities other than one’s own experiences are knowable. Kimpel argues, “Neither Kant, nor anyone else, has made it ‘fully clear’ that knowledge is only of phenomena” (pp. 39, 40). Rather, “In knowing the meaning of an informed affirmation about a reality, one would then be informed of two realities—a subject’s interpretation; and a reality about which his interpretations inform him” (p. 40). On the ground of inspiration we need not deny interpretive aspects of scriptural assertions concerning redemptive acts and the God who performed them. We simply suggest that the superintendence of the Holy Spirit kept the biblical interpreters of revelatory events from error of thought, fact, or judgment. Their assertions concerning the triune nature of God are not merely interpretations; they are true interpretations of what is the case. According to Scripture an eternal Being exists independently of projections of human thought. Futhermore, Scripture makes clear that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct within the Godhead.
Where do the Scriptures teach ontological trinitarianism? The trinitarian distinctions are regarded eternal (a) from those passages which speak of the existence of the Word from eternity with the Father (John 1:1, 2; Phil. 2:6); (b) from passages asserting or implying Christ’s preexistence (John 8:58; 1:18; Col. 1:15–17; Rev. 22:13, 14); (c) from passages implying fellowship between the Father and the Son before the foundation of the world (John 17:5, 24); (d) from passages asserting the creation of the world by Christ (John 1:13; Heb. 1:2, 10); (e) from passages asserting or implying the eternity of the Holy Spirit (Gen. 1:2; Psa. 33:6; Heb. 9:14). (See A. H. Strong, Systematic Theology [Judson Press, 1907, p. 326]. Additional biblical documentation may be found in E. H. Bickersteth, The Trinity [Kregel, 1959], and G. A. F. Knight, A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the Trinity [Oliver and Boyd, 1953].)
Barabbas
Possessor of the name
We usually see fit
To link with yet
Another word: acquit.
Peter: deny.
Judas, but a way
To more than amply
Call to mind: betray.
Barabbas: he chosen
In place of Christ;
His freedom rather
Highly priced.
And Jesus? To Barabbas
Here was no whim Of doctrine. Here was fact:
Christ in place of him.
FRED MOECKEL
Does it seem obscurantist to accept such ontological assertions? Acceptance of them is not limited to those who neglect evidence. No less a scholar than William Adams Brown would remind us of the metaphysical implications of the Scriptures:
In the quiet of the study or the classroom it is easy to speak of banishing metaphysical terms from theology, but in practice it is impossible. To do this would involve not simply the rewriting of our theological systems, but of our hymns, our liturgies, even of the Bible itself. The doctrine of the Trinity in its completeness may be a product of the fourth century, but its beginnings go back to the very threshold of Christianity and the men who laid its foundations are not Origen and Athanasius, but the apostle Paul and the fourth evangelist. The Christ of the New Testament is not simply the man of Nazareth, but the pre-incarnate Logos, the Word that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. Either we must be prepared to break with historic Christianity altogether and banish large parts of the New Testament from their place in our public worship, or else we must be able to give some rational account of the metaphysical element in early Christian theology and its present significance for the church (Christian Theology in Outline, Scribner’s, 1916, pp. 158–59).
If to be true to the New Testament we can and must speak metaphysically, that is, of God as he is in himself, then we either believe what the Bible implies concerning the triune nature of God or we deny its ontological trustworthiness. It is here maintained that because of the Holy Spirit’s guidance we may trust without qualification not only the biblical writers’ descriptions of events but also their assertions concerning the triune nature of the God who redeems and renews sinners. It is furthermore argued that such inspired assertion is the only basis on which conclusively to answer modalistic trinitarianism.
GORDON R. LEWIS
Associate Professor of Theology
Conservative Baptist Theological Seminary
Denver, Colorado
