(This is part three of a four-part series on Shiite Islam and the Iranian regime. Please click here to read parts one and two.)
The previous articles centered on the origins of Shiite Islam and its political history to examine the Shiite basis for Iran’s vision of government, one that is based on the central concept of wilayat al-faqih, translated literally as “guardianship of the jurist,” meaning the rule of a sharia expert.
A brief recap: The two primary theological concerns of Shiism are Islamic justice and leadership, both represented in the figure of the imam. The large majority of Shiites, including most in Iran, are called Twelvers since they follow the line of 12 imams beginning with Ali, Muhammad’s cousin, whom they believe should have immediately inherited the prophet’s political position—but was wrongly denied.
Iran returned Shiites to power. Prior to the Islamic Republic, the ruling shah belonged to the sect but was a secular and modernizing leader. But does the restoration of religious government honor or betray the Shiite heritage? To evaluate, we will now examine the end of the lineage of imams and the two rare instances when Twelver dynasties ruled in Iran—without a rightful imam.
Ali did eventually lead the Islamic community as the fourth caliph, and Sunni Muslims agree his governance was just. Yet when civil war and assassination ended Ali’s rule, Sunnis controlled the empire and often persecuted Shiites as rival claimants to Muhammad’s mantle. The imams counseled patience to the Shiite community, knowing they were a vulnerable political minority. They focused on religion, guiding their followers in the right understanding of Islam.
But in AD 874, the Twelfth Imam, a five-year-old boy, disappeared.
This threw the Twelver community into confusion, and many drifted toward a rival Shiite sect called Ismailism, which had broken off from the Twelvers in AD 765 and ruled a powerful dynasty from Cairo. But Twelvers said that the child did not simply vanish but that Allah had preserved his life in occultation.
In astronomy, the term refers to one celestial body passing in front of another and blocking its view. Here Shiites said that Allah was hiding the imam from public view—especially from the Sunni authorities—until he could grow up and restore Shiites to Islamic political leadership. In the immediate aftermath, the treasurer of the deceased 11th imam continued to collect the Shiite tithe and answer believers’ questions, claiming to communicate with the child in secret.
After nearly 70 years passed without the imam’s reappearance, this “minor” (or short-term) occultation gave way to a “major” occultation that lasts to this day. Twelver scholars held that Allah has preserved the Twelfth Imam for centuries at the peak of his physical power. He is popularly believed to appear in dreams and visions to advise and encourage the community.
But one day, Shiites say, he will return in power as the Mahdi, the awaited one who would lead Muslims back to the just practice of their religion. Jesus, they believe, will appear at his side in assistance, and all the world will submit to Islam. The scholars counseled Shiites to endure patiently their place in the Sunni caliphate until then but not admit to its religious legitimacy.
In AD 934, however, a Shiite revolt led by Zaydis succeeded in the Caspian region of what was then Persia. Zaydis differed from Twelvers, as they believed the imam’s legitimacy rested less on his spiritual heritage and more on his commitment to confront injustice. They established the Buyid dynasty and switched religious orientation to adopt a Twelver position as their territory expanded to Baghdad, in modern-day Iraq. Some scholars say that once in power, Buyid leaders preferred subjects without a religious heritage of revolt.
Perhaps recognizing the limitations of regional geopolitics, they reached an accord with the Sunni Abbasid caliphate and sided with it against the rival Ismailis in Egypt. Tolerant toward their Sunni-majority population, the Buyids defended the religious legitimacy of their dynasty by supporting Shiite scholars. Otherwise, why should they be independent of the Sunni caliph?
Twelvers were confused. But also privileged. The Mahdi had not returned, yet Shiites held sway. Scholars deduced that ultimate political authority was still illegitimate absent the Twelfth Imam. Participation in government, however, no longer felt treasonous. Cooperation was possible as long as the authorities ruled consistently with Shiite conceptions of justice and protected their community.
In time, both the Buyid and the Ismaili dynasties collapsed, and Sunnis resumed control over the Arab and Persian worlds. But it was the Ottoman Turks who eventually rose in strength, creating a sultanate that absorbed the Sunni caliphate in 1517.
At the turn of the century, however, a different Turkish clan emerged from the Caucasus highlands to found the Safavid Empire in Iran. During the centuries in between, Shiites did not have a state of their own. Sometimes they faced persecution and had to hide their faith. Other times, if they did not rebel, the Sunni caliphs left them alone. The heritage of Ali, representing the family of Muhammad, protected them somewhat since it held great symbolic religious weight.
The Safavids also adopted a Twelver identity and, during their two-century rule, forcefully imposed it to create a Shiite majority. The shah—or king—defined his dynasty in opposition to Sunni powers and to minimize internal opposition.
But Shiism took hold. It appealed to Iranians as a national faith against the dominance of Arabs and Turks. The shah claimed to descend from Ali and to rule as the Hidden Imam’s representative. This accorded with the Iranian political culture that had viewed the leader as semi-divine since its origins in the ancient Zoroastrian religion. Iranians also cherished the tradition of a social contract that upholds the ruler’s legitimacy. The Safavids preached the example of Ali and brought prosperity to the nation. Constantly at odds with stronger Sunni powers, the people also resonated with the idea of a Mahdi who would lead them to eventual victory.
Both Buyids and Safavids faced the same problem, however: How should they legislate their state without an imam? The original 12 imams could directly interpret the Quran and Muslim traditions. In their absence, scholars now had to do the work—supported officially by the governing regime.
The leading experts ruled that multiple sharia scholars could produce different but equally valid verdicts. A system developed akin to peer review in Western academia. Seminaries trained the religiously inclined, who were licensed and rose in clerical rank as senior scholars recognized their aptitude. And in the late 18th century, Twelvers developed a position for the top Shiite scholar: the marja al-taqlid, meaning the source of emulation for other to follow.
The prestige of the marja al-taqlid is comparable to that of the Catholic pope. Islam, however, lacks an authoritative religious establishment, so the idea developed that individual Shiites could follow a legitimate sharia scholar of their choice. While the marja al-taqlid was undoubtedly a senior cleric, others felt inclined to follow other figures. Several maraji (the Arabic plural of marja) emerged as their students multiplied in number and esteem. Some lived in Sunni areas, others in Twelver domains. But all recognized that ultimate governance rested solely with the Mahdi.
Christians and Jews are no strangers to the idea of waiting for the return and ultimate rule of a Messiah and living in the tension of what is not yet here. The political nature of Islam complicates it further for Shiites. Is wilayat al-faqih the best solution? Part four of this series concludes with modern-day Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.
