The dominant fact about the Far East is that the Communists are threatening to absorb it.
They already control mainland China. They are pressing to complete the conquest of China by liquidating the noncommunist Chinese government in Taiwan. And they seek to control the other 10 free nations that extend from Burma to Japan.
The Communists are striving constantly in this direction, and are shifting from one type of thrust to another in their probing for weak spots in the free nations’ resistance.
The immediate target of the Communists is the free countries of the Far East, eight of which have become independent since World War II. The region has vast undeveloped resources, physical and human, but there is a general lack of adequate technical know-how, a shortage of capital for industrial development, and some of the countries have not yet achieved the political stability necessary for economic and social growth.
They would have little hope of having time to grow strong were it not for their anticommunist Western friends. Communist China has emerged strong and hostile. It is closely allied with the Soviet Union. It is dynamic, and it is expansionist. The reality of this makes it urgent that the free world build up the power of noncommunist nations while taking such measures as are available to curb the growth of Communist power and influence. It is the policy of the United States to do just this.
Our policy requires persistent action on two fronts—with reference to Communist China, and in regard to the free areas of the Far East. We must do all that is possible to prevent the Peiping regime from attaining its objective. We must maintain military strength in the area at a level sufficient to deter the Chinese Communists from employing their growing military power. We also must avoid any step which would add momentum to the Chinese Communist drive for increased influence and status in Asia.
Recognition Of Red China
General diplomatic recognition of Communist China and allowing it to shoot its way into the United Nations would have a dramatic psychological effect throughout Asia; it would appear as a major Chinese Communist victory, a sign that we had capitulated before the Communist pressures. This would discourage resistance to communism throughout the area and deal devastating blows to the morale of noncommunist Asian nations. The penetration of Chinese Communist influence throughout the area would be immensely facilitated. The important Chinese of the area would have no choice except to swing to support of Red China.
Economic moves must be continued in order to deter the Peiping regime. Communist China utilizes its manufactured goods for political purposes in trade arrangements in Asia and the Middle East, and any relaxation of our economic controls would facilitate their efforts to establish a heavy industrial base and add to their ability to manufacture armaments. Such relaxation would make it difficult for noncommunist Asia to industrialize at a rate comparable to that of Communist China. A relaxation that permitted Chinese Communists to release goods from controls and to use them in construction of airfields, strategic railways, and other military purposes would contribute to the Peiping regime’s military buildup.
Blocking Communist Aggression
In respect to the noncommunist Asian nations, we must first of all seek to maintain a military counterpoise through strengthening indigenous forces. A system of alliances also is necessary to assure outside support in event of Communist aggression. United States military aid programs and the disposition of United States forces in support of defense commitments are designed to provide this counterpoise.
Furthermore, we and other Western anticommunists must strengthen the free Asian nations’ resistance to the infiltration and subversion of Communist Chinese and also the latter’s blandishments and attractions. A program of economic assistance and various political measures are intended to encourage the growth of strong and healthy noncommunist governments.
The United States resolution in the above respects is a major barrier to the Chinese Communists’ foreign policy objective of destroying the free Asian governments. That is why Peiping attacks the United States so bitterly—domestically in a venomous “hate America” campaign, in propaganda to free Asia branding us as “imperialists,” and in direct efforts to expel our strength and influence from the western Pacific so that the Chinese Communists might seize Taiwan and thus pierce the free world’s Far Eastern line of defense. The Chinese Communists’ attack upon Quemoy and Matsu last summer, proclaimed by them to be only the first phase of an attempt to “liberate Taiwan,” was a manifestation of their attempt to remove the barrier U. S. policy has erected against their expansionism.
About Other Courses
There are some who argue that there are other courses of action for the United States in the Far East that are “more realistic” or “less rigid” or “more imaginative.” On examination, however, these other courses of action prove actually less realistic and naive rather than imaginative, and would lead to compromise and retreat rather than being merely “less rigid.” All Americans would naturally reject as unthinkable the alternative of mustering outside military effort to overcome the regime.
However, two courses of action other than the one we have chosen are sometimes advocated: 1. change the hostile nature of the Chinese Communist regime, and 2. alienate Communist China from the U.S.S.R. Let us examine these alternatives:
1. It is unlikely that a policy aimed at overcoming the basic hostility of the Chinese Communist regime would succeed. This is not a defeatist conclusion; it is based upon several realistic considerations. The Chinese Communists have shown that they are dedicated to the communization of Asia. In February 1950, two months after their take over of the mainland, they called upon all the peoples of Southeast Asia to overthrow their governments because, they proclaimed, their leaders were puppets of the imperialists. Before the year was out they had invaded Tibet and Korea. They have stubbornly refused a political settlement in Korea and are continuing their control of North Korea through a puppet regime. Stepping into the Indochina war, they added North Vietnam to their controlled territory. They are demanding major concessions in Taiwan, on which they reject all compromise. To grant concessions and give respectability to their aggressions would undermine the whole position of the free world in Asia. Lesser concessions of an economic or prestige nature would not alter the Communists’ basic objective. They would only encourage the Communists to step up their demands. Also, unless such minor concessions were balanced by satisfactory quid pro quo, they would create confusion and misunderstanding in much of free Asia that would help the Communists’ cause there. Concessions by the free world without suitable Chinese Communist concessions would be appeasement. Appeasement always brings new demands. The world has learned bitter lessons from attempts to appease a powerful totalitarian foe.
We must not forget there is a vast difference between the intelligent and friendly Chinese people and their Communist masters. The people have no say in their public affairs. Less than two per cent of them are even members of the Communist party, and the party is a highly disciplined organization directed by a very few fanatical international Communists basically knit together by deep ideological convictions. The Chinese Communists believe that the Communist world outlook is the only correct one and they argue that China’s welfare depends upon the advance of Communism. They know the United States opposes that advance. They accept the thesis that their doctrine is infallible, and under this doctrine the United States is the archenemy.
They are closely linked to the Soviet Union by common ideology and military dependence. Even in the unlikely event the Chinese Communists should decide to shift away from a hostile policy, they could not do so without gravely weakening their tie to the U.S.S.R. This alliance is important to both, so there is little likelihood the Chinese Communists will choose any course not espoused by the U.S.S.R.
Expressions of hostility toward the United States are a useful tool of the Peiping regime to divert attention of the Chinese population, particularly of the youth that lacks long association with Americans. This diversion is necessary in view of the regime’s own shortcomings. It provides a rationale for insisting on a sacrifice by the population for the state’s benefit. Other totalitarian systems have employed this device. It is scarcely credible the Chinese Communists would feel able to abandon this tool which has been of such tremendous political value to them.
2. To alienate Communist China from the U.S.S.R. would require pressures or inducements which the free world is in no position to advance. The mortar of ideological affinity would need to be dissolved, as would the shared objectives and the Chinese Communist military and economic dependence on the U.S.S.R. which cements the Sino-Soviet alliance.
The fact that the Soviet Union’s leaders have indicated they once tried and then abandoned the commune experiment while the Chinese Communists seem determined to pursue it does not indicate any rifts in the partnership. On the contrary, there are many events that suggest the opposite. Peiping’s endorsement of Russia’s Hungarian massacres is one example. Its denunciation of Tito is another. There are indeed various signs that the two realize more clearly than ever their mutual interdependence.
Chinese Communists have made it clear that their major domestic aim is the building of a modern industrial system capable of supporting their gigantic war machine. Given the growing complexity of modern weapons, it will be many years before the Chinese Communists can become militarily self-sufficient. Meanwhile, they must depend upon the Soviet Union for modern weapons and replacement parts, and also for machinery and equipment necessary to construct such weapons. Integration of the Chinese Communist forces with those of the U.S.S.R. is essential to preserve the effectiveness of the combined Communist striking power.
Increased trade with the West would not wean the Chinese Communists away from the Soviet Union. It would, rather, permit them to enjoy the best of both worlds. They would still rely upon the U.S.S.R. for highly strategic goods while obtaining from the West a much wider range of commodities than they receive today and at a lower cost. This would help them accelerate their industrialization and militarization programs, and would have no appreciable effect upon their alliance with Russia.
Political inducements would only enhance the Chinese Communists’ international prestige and influence. There is little reason to believe this would interfere with its relationship with the Soviet Union. Instead, it probably would confirm to the Chinese Communists the value of their Soviet alliance. Thus, the partners’ drive to extend Communist influence in Asia would then be immeasurably strengthened.
A Deadly Threat
The essential fact remains that Chinese Communist policies pose deadly threats to the collective security of the free world. It is clear that American interests and those of other free world nations are best served by opposing the advance of Communist power in the Far East, by withholding diplomatic recognition from the Chinese Communists and opposing its seating in the United Nations, by supporting a noncommunist China, and by continuing to help build strong free nations in Asia that are dedicated to improving the way of life of their peoples.
The force that we oppose in the Far East is a materialistic force. It denies the validity of those moral and spiritual principles upon which our own civilization is based. It challenges the philosophical concepts we have written into our basic law. It repudiates the individual as of intrinsic significance. It despises religion. It denies the existence of God.
If this force were to change its character, its meaning to us would change. We do not think this is likely. But we are ready to react to whatever transpires in a way that would protect our interests and those of other freedom-loving people who, as we, are determined to preserve that freedom.
END
Because of recent heavy demands upon the time of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, augmented by hospitalization because of a recurrence of cancer, the subject of the recognition of Communist China is handled for Christianity Today readers by Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who is intimately acquainted with the position of the United States vis-a-vis Communist China.
