Peace and War (Part II)
The peaceful decade of the 1920s provided a hospitable platform for liberal Protestant preachments on international cooperation devoid of force or threat of force. But these blueprints of peace would soon be rendered obsolete by the warring thirties which transformed peaceful international cooperation into a collective security that carried with it the risk of war. The optimism of one decade had not foreseen the brutality of the next. For those Americans to whom the thought of U. S. engagement in another war was intolerable, there was an alternativeโisolationism. Even while rejecting the label, The Christian Century turned in this direction in the second half of the thirties, a period which would see Protestantism badly split as it confronted the hazardous choice.
During this period there was widespread belief that economic factors almost alone were responsible for U. S. involvement in World War I. Cocking a disillusioned eye at these factors, the Century did its best to prevent repetition of such an occurrence. An editorial titled โTaking the Profits Out of Warโ concluded, โFor if war actually comes, profit or no profit, civilization will dieโ (May 1, 1935, p. 568). Thus the Century crusade against capitalism in that period was fought not only with the weapons of domestic politics, but rather the issue was broadened to embrace humanityโs hopes for peace, which perhaps awaited the โdethronement of the twin gods of capitalism and absolute national sovereigntyโ (Aug. 23, 1933, p. 1055).
As the League of Nations was entering its mortal agonies in Geneva and the Pact of Paris was becoming a fast-fading memory, the Century, in accents of economic determinism, declared: โWith each year the doubt increases that any peace plan can succeed โฆ until the worldโs economic problem moves into a wholly new phase. Behind all our political governments there stands an invisible government which controls them. Our governments are not free; they are bound by the economic system. In undertaking to keep peaceโthat is, in joining the league or in signing the Kellogg pactโthey have probably undertaken more than they can deliver. Governments are helpless agencies in the hands of national economic self-interest. From now on, it will probably be increasingly confessed by peace lovers that their work for peace must go behind political governments and deal radically with the economic system which governs themโ (Sept. 11, 1935, p. 1137).
In an article, โBehind the Fleet Maneuvers,โ Harold E. Fey, present Century editor but then secretary of the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation, charged โthose shortsighted men who represent the only statesmanship that our capitalistic system has producedโ with trying to halt democrary short of providing equitable distribution of economic privilege. โโฆ These intellects look to fascism to provide the one remaining hope of capitalism, and they know that the easiest method to lead this country into fascism would be through becoming involved in the dictatorship which is inevitable in a modern war.โ Danger of war in the Orient โlies in a capitalism which refuses to distribute wealth to the people who produce it and which therefore must constantly seek out new fields for dumping surplus goods and the investment of capitalโ (May 22, 1935, pp. 697 f.).
(In 1917 those who called the war โa war for Wall Streetโ were charged by the Century with โa lamentable ignorance of historic movementsโ in allowing โeconomic prejudicesโ to obscure the fact that the war was โin behalf of democracyโ [May 17, p. 5].)
The Century fought a running battle against Franklin Rooseveltโs moves toward โpreparedness to wage war.โ It saw โthe appeal to violenceโ as the โdestruction of democracy.โ โThe development of the war spirit is the development of the effective and indispensable instrument of dictatorship. Those who look that way, look toward fascismโ (July 24, 1935, p. 959). Fey warned in Century articles that conscription would mean fascist dictatorship (Jan. 27, 1937, pp. 107โ109; May 31, 1939, pp. 698โ700).
When Hider announced German rearmament in 1935, the Century opposed any increase of U. S. military and naval establishments (Mar. 27, p. 392). Rooseveltโs peace policy was attacked as โmilitary preparedness to the uttermost possible farthingโ (May 27, 1936 p. 757), and the Century therefore desired replacement of โthe present weak neutrality laws with legislation of an inclusive and mandatory characterโ (Jan. 6, 1937, p. 8). As war drew near, the โPresidentโs demand for a supernavyโ was opposed (Mar. 9, 1938, pp. 294โ296; May 4, 1938, pp. 550 f.).
The Century earlier had called for a U.S. guarantee of economic (as well as military) neutrality with an embargo on every form of help to make war, applying to all nations, Britain included. If such a peace plan were followed, โโฆ we believe that the danger of a new world war would be almost done awayโ (Mar. 28, 1934, p. 412). By 1939 desire for such legislation remainedโalongside pessimism as to the possibility of attaining it (May 17, p. 632).
In 1937 the Century acknowledged that the Kellogg Pact had broken down. It also admitted that American isolation was a chief factor in preventing the collective system (embodied in the League) from functioning, but after all, the League was seen as a means of perpetuating the Versailles treaty and of developing a balance of power, both undesirable to the Century (Sept. 15, 1937, pp. 1127โ29).
Memory Of The First World War
Helping to push the Century toward isolationism was the memory of World War I and the โelement of shameโ in the churchesโ support of that war (Jan. 20, 1937, pp. 72โ74). Morrison pointed to the heavy financial burdens of the magazine which took much of his time until 1919 when three men gave him adequate financial support. โI have no illusion that The Christian Century would have taken a radically different position had the financial release come earlier. The idea that war was a religious issue, a test of religious reality, in the way we now conceive it, was too vague to do more than haunt my conscience ineffectually.โ As for his 1937 position on war, he noted the Century had never taken the pledge of absolute pacifism but declared that the philosophical differences were โacademic.โ He took satisfaction in its pioneering contribution to the โvolume of Christian conviction against warโ developed since World War I (Mar. 31, 1937, pp. 409โ411).
On the eve of war, the churches were told they could not in good conscience leave Christian conscientious objectors in doubt as to church support since their decisions were made on the basis of the churchesโ teaching on โthe sinful nature of warโ (June 7, 1939, p. 729). The churches were also repeatedly urged to withdraw from the military chaplaincy program (Dec. 21, 1938, pp. 567โ569; Jan. 16, 1935, pp. 70โ72).
However, Feyโs advocacy of the proposed Ludlow amendment to the Constitution, making declaration of war dependent upon a national referendum, was opposed by the Century as increasing โthe danger of resort in crisis to a fascist dictatorshipโ (Jan. 5, 1938, p. 8; cf. Dec. 29, 1937, pp. 1617 f.).
Pacifists often seem impelled by their own interests to draw a nicer picture of the enemy than warranted by the facts. Aggressions tend to be rationalized. Conversely, the weak points of their own society tend to be exaggerated. In an article, โCancel the Naval Maneuvers!โ Fey declared: โโฆ the recent attitude of our government toward Japan has been aloof, hostile and is now verging on the provocative.โ โWhat is needed now is โฆ organization to make the provocative actions of our government unpopular โฆ and to prepare a continuing method of opposition to war should war occurโ (Mar. 6, 1935, pp. 298, 300). R. M. Miller cites as pacifist intolerance the Centuryโs terming โAlbert Einsteinโs defection from absolute pacifism (after his experiences in Nazi Germany) an unworthy deed indicating the scientist was not made of stern stuffโ (American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919โ1939, p. 339).
The Century was determined not to be provoked by aggression into support of war. Though detesting the Franco revolt in Spain, democracy in Spain was declared destroyed whatever the outcome of the conflict. Thus the Century opposed liberals who advocated sending American volunteers to fight for the Spanish government: โAmerica has already been betrayed into one European war over this faked issue of saving democracyโ (Jan. 27, 1937, pp. 104โ106).
The May 19 issue of 1937 contained an editorial, โJapan Turns Toward Peace,โ which noted some soft Tokyo words toward China and concluded the prospect for peace in eastern Asia to be the brightest in a generation, with Japanese imperialist thought beginning โto pass into eclipseโ (pp. 640โ642). But in July Japan launched a full scale attack upon China. The Century called for application of the neutrality law, declaring U. S. involvement โin the tragic events by which Asiatic peoples will work out their fatesโ would be folly (Aug. 11, 1937, pp. 989โ991).
The journal favored invoking the neutrality law not only in Asia but also against Italy, Germany, Russia, and the โostensible combatants in Spainโ (Aug. 11, 1937, p. 991). It denounced Anthony Edenโs toughness toward dictators and expressed hope that Premier Chamberlainโs pre-Munich concessions to them would bring peace (Mar. 2, 1938, pp. 262 f.). Austriaโs annexation was taken lightly (Mar. 23, 1938, p. 358).
The Century noted the recession of pacifist sentiment in the American churches in reaction to Hitler and his Munich gains. Racial arrogance made clear the โunregenerate and brutish instincts of human nature despite Christianityโs long acceptance in Western civilization,โ and was a further challenge to pacifist faith (Dec. 28, 1938, p. 1600).
On the Munich settlement, the Century vacillated from week to week between condemning Germany on one hand and Britain and France on the other. Munich, it was said, was possibly no more immoral than Versailles (Sept. 28, 1938, pp. 1150โ1152; Oct. 12, pp. 1224โ1226; Nov. 30, pp. 1456โ1458). There was no ideological crisisโโMunich Europeโ had simply reverted to the old game of power politics (Feb. 15, 1939, pp. 206 f.).
Among those who followed this line of thought, the bogy of Versailles seemed to blot from memory the harsh treaty of Brest-Litovsk dictated by Germany to Russia in 1918 (see D. B. Meyer, The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919โ1941, pp. 378โ380).
From Munich to Pearl Harbor, the Century was determinedly and vociferously isolationist. Coming of war in Europe did not change this stand save to intensify it. American morality, it was urged, demanded it.
The month before the war, President Roosevelt was excoriated for hoping to โextricate the nation from its economic difficultiesโ by making munitions available to European nations in time of war. Speaking in accents of the America Firsters, the editorial went on: โWhy should the United States enter another general European war?โฆ No nation could win a major war today, either in Europe or Asia, and have enough strength left to contemplate invasion of the Western hemisphere for a generationโ (Aug. 2, 1939, pp. 942 f.). But the old pacifist internationalism expressed itself in a call by C. C. Morrison and others for a world economic conference to turn aside the threat of war. European churchmen replied that the crisis had moved beyond the economic phase, but at American insistence, leaders of the World Council of Churches finally suggested a small unofficial meeting of churchmen. Thirty-four persons gathered and produced a statement. By the time of its publication in the Century, war had already been declared (Meyer, op. cit., pp. 372 f.).
With the return of war, the Century prophesied the possible end of civilization, applauded Rooseveltโs, pledge to attempt preservation of Americaโs peace, urged maintenance of the arms embargo, and expressed lack of concern for Polandโs fate because of that countryโs โrecord of persecuting its minoritiesโ (Sept. 13, 1939, pp. 1094 f.; Sept. 20, pp. 1126โ1129).
In โNot Americaโs Warโ the Century set its goal for the next two years in stressing the necessity of guarding the American mind โat the point of its sentimental promptingโ to go to the aid of the Allies.
โWhen the war is stripped of its pretensions it stands forth in its naked motivation as a war of empires. It is not Englandโs war. It is the British empireโs war. This fact, seen steadily, should be enough to deflate the appeal to America to come in and help save democracy. For democracy and imperialism are incompatible.โฆ
โThere is not room in the world for two imperialisms such as Britain is and Germany wants to be โฆ The United Kingdom, consisting of England, Scotland, Wales and Ulster, would be, apart from the empire, in no more danger from Germany or any European power than is Norway or Sweden or Denmark.โฆ It is the existence of the British empire which, together with imperial France, has produced Nazi Germany.โฆ Great Britain must be made to know that America will not come to the defense of the British empire.โฆโ (Nov. 22, 1939, pp. 1431โ1433).
This sort of interpretation roused the ire of many Protestant leaders. Names like Niebuhr, Oxnam, Van Dusen, Dulles, Sherrill, Mott, and Mackay appeared under a declaration that โan interpretation of the present conflicts as merely a clash of rival imperialisms can spring only from ignorance or moral confusion. The basic distinction between civilizations in which justice and freedom are still realities and those in which they have been displaced by ruthless tyranny cannot be ignoredโ (Jan. 31, 1940, pp. 152 f.).
French Disaster And Yet Hope
In commenting on the fall of France, the Century looked to Hitler with a little hope. It reminded its readers that Hitler had โproclaimed this war as a crusade on plutocratic capitalismโ and that his national socialism had brought about a social revolution which had driven capitalism out of control of Germany. โWe Americans have minimized the reality and importance of this revolution because we have been revolted by its hideous brutalities and disgusted by the personalities of its leaders.โฆ Can Hitler give the rest of the world a system of interrelationships better than the tradestrangling and man-exploiting system of empire capitalism? We have small hope that he can, but hope must not be given up entirely until it is known what he intends to do with this victoryโ (June 26, 1940, p. 815).
An attempted probing of Europeโs future sought to reassure anxious Americans that Franceโs fate would not really be so bad after all:
โIn a united Europe governed from the German center, with a unified planned economy covering the continent, France will be able to find compensations in terms of human values. A France which has thrown off the artificial structure of empire and of capitalistic dominion in industry, together with the intolerable burden of the vast military establishment which goes with them, may experience a new emancipation, a genuine and creative revival of economic freedom. Such a France may be the first great modern society to pass through the gate of disillusionment concerning those values clustering about the mythical concept of the โeconomic manโ which have hypnotized and perverted Western civilization for centuriesโ (Sept. 25, 1940, p. 1166).
France was expected to emerge from subjection before too long. โA France that is a product of schools which have been swept clean of secularism will be at least a France with a faithโand a faith which is incompatible with the faith of nazisโ (ibid., p. 1167). Meyer graphically describes the Century ordeal:
โThe โat leastโ was a pressure point, betraying the terrible costs Morrison was having to pay: the new schools he was describing were the schools into which Roman Catholicism had been returned. The political structure he thought might follow Hitler was an Italian-French-Spanish bloc, a โLatin Catholic totalitarianism.โ In the man who had fixed sharply upon the โshort-runโ issues in 1928 [A1 Smithโs presidential campaign], โฆ who had protested the Taylor mission to the Vatican, it was apparent that for him to down such bitter potionโthe thirst for neutrality burned the soulโ (op. cit., p. 381).
Roosevelt Toward Fascism
On the home front, the Century was fighting against conscription and a third term for Roosevelt: โIf to the cohesive strength of the selfish interests which constitute the party in power is now added conscription, the Presidentโs power, having broken the two-term limitation, will be essentially the same as that of any European dictatorโ (Aug. 28, 1940, p. 1047). โThe party in power, unable to unify the national life at the level of its economic well-being, now turns to the war as a unifying substitute.โ The one-party system was seen as the essence of fascism. โ[Mr. Roosevelt] is the Fรผhrer of this inchoate fascismโ (July 31, 1940, pp. 942 f.). Conscription was seen as increasing the danger of war rather than contributing to Americaโs defense (Sept. 25, 1940, pp. 1168โ1170).
Meyer points out that Morrisonโs peace apology โcolored with bitternessโ as he both suffered the excruciation of his own โinner rationalizationsโ and became the object of โthe most withering of the fire of the interventionistsโ (op. cit., pp. 381 f.). In answer to the question, โWhat can America do for peace?โ the Century proposed the President send a delegation of American statesmen to Europeโs neutral capitals to convene a peace conference to sit until warโs end and plan a new Europe (May 15, 1940, pp. 630โ632). In a Century article, โIrresponsible Idealism,โ Union Seminaryโs Henry P. Van Dusen flayed the Century for grossly misleading Christians to think a peace conference would have the slightest chance of success. He charged: โresolute unwillingnessโ to face known facts, โfalsification of issues,โ unforgivable escapism, and โbetrayal of truthโ (July 24, 1940, pp. 924 f.). The Century in turn described Van Dusenโs mind as one of โthe warโs intellectual casualtiesโ (ibid., p. 919).
Reinhold Niebuhr saw in the conference proposal โa completely perverse and inept foreign policy,โ a search for a โsimple way outโ (May 29, 1940, pp. 706 f.). He charged forgetfulness of: Germanyโs โpagan religion of tribal self-glorification,โ its intention to โroot out the Christian religion,โ its defiance of universal standards of justice, its โmaniacal furyโ toward the Jews, its declared intention of enslaving the other races of Europe โto the โmasterโ race.โ โIf anyone believes that the peace of such a tyranny is morally more tolerable than war I can only admire and pity the resolute dogmatism which makes such convictions possible.โ Niebuhr felt uneasy in the security he possessed while others were dying for principles in which he believed. The question of American intervention was โnot primarily one of the morals but of strategy in the sense that I believe we ought to do whatever has to be done to prevent the triumph of this intolerable tyranny.โ The Centuryโs type of neutralism was characterized as โpitiless perfectionism, which has informed a large part of liberal Protestantism in Americaโ and which was wrong not only on the war issue but โwrong about the whole nature of historical reality,โ for it failed to see that justice had always been established through tension between various forces and interests in society. Niebuhr allowed a place for a thoroughgoing pacifism resigned to martyrdom and political irresponsibility, โbut we have precious little of it in America because most of our pacifism springs from an unholy compound of gospel perfectionism and bourgeois utopianism, the latter having had its rise in eighteenth century rationalism.โ This โsentimentalized Christianityโ โis always fashioning political alternatives to the tragic business of resisting tyranny,โ but โno matter how they twist and turn, the protagonists of a political, rather than a religious, pacifism end with the acceptance and justification of, and connivance with, tyrannyโ (Dec. 18, 1940, pp. 1578โ1580).
But still, the Ministers No War Committee of 1941 embraced far more names of eminent liberal Protestant clergymen than were found on the letterheads of any interventionist organization (Meyer, op. cit., p. 374). Responding to a Niebuhr criticism of pacifists, the Century described it as an illustration of an โevil spirit,โ threatening the unity of the Church (July 2, 1941, pp. 853 f.). Niebuhr notwithstanding, the Century, though apprehensive at the prospect of a Hitler victory, also voiced โgrave misgivingsโ as to the effect of a British victory (Jan. 8, 1941, p. 49) and declared that if Britain won, the British empire would โbe extended to include the continent of Europeโ (Feb. 5, 1941, p. 175). There was room for doubt, it was affirmed, that U. S. interests would be better served by British monopoly of the seas than by German (Dec. 12, 1941, p. 1537โto press before Pearl Harbor). Even though a Nazi victory would mean virtual slavery for Europeans not of the โmaster race,โ on the positive side it would: probably lift the living standard in some regions; โestablish socialism of a sort, at least to the extent of forcing a transfer of power from the capitalist classesโ; and, additionally, โbreak the power of the international bankersโ (Feb. 19, 1941, pp. 248 f.).
The Century actually did not wish victory for either side but kept pronouncing stalemate at various stages of the war and repeatedly demanded a negotiated peace, the treaty to provide for codification of international law by a world league. The cornerstone of such a juridical structure was to be the principle of outlawry of war. Believing that a โvictorโs peaceโ could not even approximate justice, the Century called upon โthe Christian forces of the worldโ to โrally their strengthโ for the achievement of a โpeace without victoryโ (Mar. 12, 1941, pp. 353 f.).
When Congress passed the Lend-Lease bill, the Century saw the American form of government becoming one โnot of men, but of a man,โ hence taking a โlong strideโ toward Nazism (Mar. 19, 1941, p. 385). It had censured Rooseveltโs โarsenal of democracyโ speech as โa trumpet call to warโ (Jan. 1, 1941, pp. 47โ49), but with Hitlerโs attack on the Soviet Union, the Century advocated aiding the Soviets and China as well as Britain (July 2, 1941, p. 856).
Yet in the last issue before word of Pearl Harbor, the Century maintained: โEvery national interest and every moral obligation to civilization dictates that this country shall keep out of the insanity of a war which is in no sense Americaโs warโ (Dec. 12, 1941, p. 1538).
It is hardly necessary to say that Charles Clayton Morrison and many of the host of clerics who stood with him worked strenuously for what they sincerely believed to be the best for church, country and world.
But historian Miller cites the verdict of many historians from present perspective:
โโฆ clerical pacifism debilitated the moral conscience of America and gave encouragement to the dictators. By insisting upon peace at any price, ministers blinded themselves to the enormity of the crimes of the dictators, risked the destruction of Western Europe, and cut their nation off from the democracies. Many churchmen overestimated the economic motivations for war, underestimated the demoniac element in man, minimized the necessity of coercion in international relations, and placed the pleasures of peace over the demands of justiceโ (op. cit., p. 344).
The judgment has obvious theological implications as to the optimistic liberal doctrine of man.