The first national institute on Religious Freedom and Public Affairs, held November 18–21 in Washington, D.C., brought together a hundred representatives of the elements composing the American religious scene. Sponsored by The National Conference of Christians and Jews, the institute was designed to encourage the freest discussion of the relation of the diversities of American religious pluralism to public order.
Four major groups were represented at the institute: Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jews, and exponents of secularism (these regarding themselves as exponents of “the Open Society”). Each of these appealed to its own understanding of the American Tradition.
Religious pluralism was accepted as a working basis for American religious expression, and “voluntaryism” (the principle that both church membership and church support rest upon the uncoerced choice of the individual) was agreed to be a primary quality of religious adherence in America. With this broad basis of agreement as a launching pad, the institute moved into the workshop stage.
Most participants were delighted that the honeymoon period of the conference was short and that highly charged issues were brought out into the open. Ground rules preclude quotation in the absence of the explicit permission of those speaking. It may be instructive, however, to note some of the “lines of fracture” which the sessions traced.
With respect to the bearing of religion upon American voting behavior, detailed studies indicate that religious loyalties exert a profound influence upon voting. This factor was consciously tested in the national elections of 1960. It seems that for several decades presidential elections will reckon heavily with the factor of the religious affiliation of the candidates. Participants in the discussions, of whatever religious faith, did not regard this as an unmixed blessing.
With reference to public policy concerning the issues of aid for Roman Catholic parochial schools, public programs for family limitation, and legislative strictures upon gambling and upon Sunday commerce, only the broadest type of consensus emerged. Roman Catholics saw neither public injustice in a policy of tax-support for their schools, nor any justification for opposition to such support. With respect to public support of programs for family planning, particularly among the indigent who may wish such assistance, Jewish and Protestant representatives felt that the interests of public prudence and proper social concern conjoin with responsible religious policy here, so that no application of the advances in medical science may be considered illicit in itself. Roman Catholic delegates opposed, upon the bases of Catholic dogma and Natural Law, any form of artificial family limitation, and any program by which institutions or agencies supported by public funds furnish such information, whether desired by the recipient or not.
The discussions of gambling and of Sunday closing were less animated. Both questions were explored ably, and the hidden factors in the public concern for them were exposed. They were discussed by men in public life who were directly subject to the conflicting pressures of public opinion at both of these points. The participants seemed willing to deal with these issues on a two-fold basis: partly upon pragmatic grounds, and partly in accordance with the legal requirements of the First Amendment.
The question of the relation of religious groups to political pressure came in for careful treatment. It was recognized on all hands that non-involvement is impossible here. The discussion revolved around the question of what form of involvement is legitimate and prudent. It emerged from the discussion that when religious group-pressures lead to a stylizing of slates of candidates (so as to include typically a Protestant, a Roman Catholic, and a Jew), then the quality of candidates stands to be lowered.
The question of the meaning and the broad implications of religious liberty occupied the last half of the institute. Presentations were made, as noted previously, by four groups: Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jews, and secularists. The spokesmen for these “faiths” sought to present their cases in terms of contemporary theory and contemporary legislation, rather than in terms of some norm in the historical past. There was basic agreement at the point of what religious liberty means in terms of cultic practice. Problems and divergences appeared chiefly over situations in which religious faith leads men to a given course of action.
Involved here is a vast range of questions: religious instruction in the organs of general education, the observance of religious holidays, the use of religious formulae in public life, the maintenance of military chaplains, and so on. Opinions seemed to polarize around two centers: Roman Catholics and (perhaps to a less marked degree) Protestants were concerned to maintain a liberty for some type of public expression of religious faith, while Jews and secularists preferred a minimum of public expression and a broader range of personal discretion in such matters.
It is to be expected that the relationship of American law to our public policy would be subjected to careful analysis in such a discussion as this. The institute was favored by the presence of several men skilled in legal matters, so that the over-simplification to which exponents of religion are tempted was overcome. It was shown that some religious practices (e.g., polygamy in Utah) are regulated regardless of the First Amendment; that the legislative power is limited by the courts, even in cases in which the exercise of such power might avoid many nuisance-situations in religious practice; and that in some cases, religious freedom is spelled out by direct legislative action.
The net result of this discussion was that many issues formerly left dangling were brought into orderly perspective. This highlights the major contribution of this First National Institute on Religious Freedom and Public Affairs.
A final trend may be noted as emerging from the discussions. Clergymen, who made up a considerable share of the participants in the institute, were at times embarrassingly aware that in numerous situations, laymen and secularists have been more forthright in their advocacy of religious freedom and equality than have been those who might be expected to lead their people in such matters. The institute emphasized that it is not merely a question of clergy or laity, nor, within the context of the clergy, whether action should be priestly or prophetic. It was rather a question of the manner of the clergy’s implementing their responsibility by constructive and far-seeing participation in public affairs.
