“Liberty seems to demand,” wrote James Madison in The Federalist, “… not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments.”
The practice of limiting terms of office in the churches is widely applied to laymen. For them indefinite office holding is generally forbidden. But the tenure of the clergy has been assumed to be otherwise. This arrangement has worked fairly well for local pastors since they labor in close association with the members of their congregations who actually are the source of final power over tenure of the clergy. Inefficient or arbitrary action at the local level has been quickly checked. But at the national level such control is much more difficult and consequently more rare. Top administrators—bishops, executive secretaries, presidents, and ministers who run the denominational machinery—have usually served despite awkwardness or near heart failure until they retired of old age. In practice the average tenure of national executives is about 20 years.
Experience indicates clearly that the losses resulting from such long terms in office far outweigh the gains. That is, administrational know-how is more than balanced by losses in perspective and sensitivity. The average high executive after a decade in office loses touch with what is going on at grass roots. More and more he turns for counsel to the denominational elite, and uninfluential people come to learn that they get little consideration from them. Moreover, men in places of leadership vary in the extent to which their energy and spirit remain unimpaired through advancing years.
An obvious way for denominations to mitigate the risks of over-long office terms is to require denominational leaders to stand for re-election and then to limit them to two terms of reasonable length, say eight years in all, a limit that was recently placed on the tenure permitted the President of the United States.
Members of some denominations, when confronted by this proposal, affirm that the constitutional framework already exists in their church for the proper control of office terms, since officials must stand for periodic re-election by national assemblies. This is true for the reason that the machinery does exist; but it is seldom really used. In other words, it does not elect but rubber-stamps the selections of a nominating committee chosen by insiders. The mores of conducting business at some national assemblies are such that actual authority is usually exercised elsewhere. The majority in these assemblies is commonly made up of persons who do not know the ropes and are attending for the first or second time, who know that free debate would lengthen the time the assembly must sit to unmanageable and expensive lengths, who are intimidated by the onward rush of an overfull agenda, and who are bewildered by the complexity of the problems on which they are asked to vote. Such a situation does not permit wise deliberation, and consequently these assemblies generally give the power of actual decision to committees or boards. Frequently the membership on these committees is influenced by the executives themselves. One of these committees, a nominating or personnel committee, often acts as the real agency for selecting denominational leaders, and it determines their tenure as well as chooses the members of other denominational committees and boards. The assembly secretary is sometimes instructed to cast one ballot for the entire slate of the nominating committee when no additional nominations have come from the floor. The techniques of genuine elections—preassembly campaigns, nominating speeches, and vote soliciting in the foyer—constitute bad form in many denominations. Thus a process which has the appearance of periodic elections can be turned into a process that results in indefinite tenure.
The same effect can follow from the more genuine elections held by other denominational assemblies. Once elected, officials in these denominations are expected to serve for the rest of their active careers.
The power of in-groups increases as a result of this situation. Government is a process whereby some people make decisions for other people. The ever-present danger, of course, is that those in power will not give equitable weight to the concerns of those out of power. Groups in power for a long time develop techniques for getting work done and for speeding up the democratic process; but all too often they tend to brush aside groups not in power, especially those that have never been in power. The opinions given weight, therefore, seem usually to come from the few.
That denominational leaders are not merely executives but also legislators heightens the urgency of the problem. So great is the prestige of their offices that they frequently determine policy, and then there is little division of governmental powers. This situation must probably continue, the realities of denominational life being what they are. The time, information, and money necessary to make denominational statesmen out of the delegates to the average national assembly will undoubtedly not be available in the near future. Consequently, the role of legislator as well as executive must in all likelihood continue to be carried in most of the denominations by top officials.
It stands to reason that such a combination of powers should not be held by any man indefinitely, however able and consecrated he may be. Ministers in high office have the same kind of human nature as the rest of us have. Because the use of power runs naturally to the abuse of power, administrators can come into their positions with deep humility only to fail after a few years to distinguish its dignity from their own. Forthright opposition to their policies is sometimes labeled obstructionism, or even called going contrary to the leadership of the Holy Spirit.
A proposal to decrease markedly the policy-making powers of the denominational executives would be an obvious reaction to the situation. Such action would probably be a mistake were not a denomination to possess a legislative assembly that truly assumed responsibility for policy making.
Another proposal would be a scheme of choosing for high office men who are within a decade or less of retirement. If it were generally adopted, this plan would deny leadership to younger men and would saddle the leader with the knowledge that he was chosen for his availability as well as for his ability.
Perhaps a better scheme would be that executives be chosen for a defined term, and be permitted to succeed themselves but once. In fairness such a scheme ought not to apply to those in office at the time it goes into effect. And for the sake of efficiency, the scheme ought not apply to nonpolicy-making technicians, or editors, research workers, and financial experts.
The present pertinence of this proposal for denominations now revising constitutions or adopting new ones is surely evident. The Proposed Constitution for the United Church, for example, provides that, “No officer of the Church shall be elected or re-elected after attaining the age of 65 years.” A better reading would be, “An officer may succeed himself but once.”
Jacob J. Vellenga served on the National Board of Administration of the United Presbyterian Church from 1948–54. Since 1958 he has served the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. as Associate Executive. He holds the A.B. degree from Monmouth College, the B.D. from Pittsburgh-Xenia Seminary, Th.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, and D.D. from Monmouth College, Illinois.
